In this paper, we present the time-memory-data (TMD) trade-off attack on stream ciphers filter function generators and filter cominers based on Maiorana-McFarland functions. This can be considered as a generalization of the time-memory-data trade-off attack of Mihaljevic and Imai on Toyocrypt. First, we substitute the filter function in Toyocrypt (which has the same size as the LFSR) with a general Maiorana-McFarland function. This allows us to apply the attack to a wider class of stream ciphers. Second, we highlight how the choice of different Maiorana-McFarland functions can affect the effectiveness of our attack. Third, we show that the attack can be modified to apply on filter functions which are smaller than the LFSR and on filter-combiner stream ciphers. This allows us to cryptanalyze other configurations commonly found in practice. Finally, filter functions with vector output are sometimes used in stream ciphers to improve the throughput. Therefore the case when the Maiorana-McFarland functions have vector output is investigated. We found that the extra speed comes at the price of additional weaknesses which make the attacks easier.
Introduction
The construction of Boolean functions with good cryptographic properties has been a well studied area of research. Some of these properties include balance, high nonlinearity, high order of resiliency, high Based on our study, we characterize the performance of the attack for different Maiorana-McFarland functions. For Maiorana-McFarland functions formed by concatenating 2 n/2 linear functions of size n/2-bit, the search space is reduced from 2 n to 2 3n/4 . When we apply the TMD attack, the search space is further reduced to 2 n/4 with 2 3n/8 consecutive keystream bits, 2 5n/8 pre-computation and 2 n/2 memory.
This case corresponds to:
1. Filter function in Toyocrypt with n = 128, k = 64.
2. Bent functions [5, 21] .
3. Resilient functions whose nonlinearity satisfies the quadratic bound [5, 21] .
For Maiorana-McFarland functions formed by concatenating a few large linear functions, we get a very effective reduction of the search space of an n-bit filter function generator from 2 n to 2 n/2 . In this case, the equivalent keylength is only half of what is claimed. As shown by Gong and Khoo [9] , this case correspond to the:
1. Saturated functions with optimal trade-off between degree, resiliency and nonlinearity, introduced by Sarkar and Maitra at Crypto 2000 1 [19] . Thus although this class of functions has the best trade-off among important cryptographic properties like nonlinearity, resiliency and algebraic degree, they are weak against the search space reduction attack. When we apply the TMD attack, the search space is further reduced to 2 n/4 with 2 n/2 consecutive keystream bits, 2 n/2 pre-computation and 2 3n/8 memory.
In Section 5, we extend our attack to the case where the Maiorana-McFarland function is of smaller size than the LFSR. This is a very common construction when the filtering function is implemented as a look-up-table (LUT). The LFSR may be 128-bit long and it is not possible to fit a LUT of size 2 128 into the memory of the cipher. Thus a smaller filter function has to be used. In that case, the complexity of the search space reduction and TMD attack depends on the width of the LFSR bits which are tapped to certain input bits of the filter function. These input bits have the property that when they are known, the Maiorana-McFarland function becomes linear.
In Section 6, we extend the attack to the filter combiner model. At each clock cycle, the Boolean function will extract several bits from each of s linear feedback shift registers LF SR i , i = 0, 1, . . . , s − 1, as input to produce a keystream bit. As analyzed by Sarkar [18] , the filter combiner offers various advantages over the filter function and combinatorial generators. We show that in this case, the search space reduction and TMD attack can also be applied effectively.
In Section 7, we extend the attack to the case where the filter function is a vectorial MaioranaMcFarland function. Vector output filter function generator has higher throughput for faster communication speed but it has an additional weakness. There is an exponential decrease in the complexity of search space reduction when compared to the single output case. This gives a very efficient attack even by a direct exhaustive search. This complexity can be further reduced by applying the TMD attack.
In Sections 3 to 7, we simplified the attack scenarios to give a clearer explanation of the attack methods. In Section 8, we describe how these attacks can be easily adapted to apply to stream ciphers that use more general linear finite state machines, tap points and filter functions. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 9.
Preliminaries

Notation
We adopt the following conventions for the functions used in this paper:
Output from a stream cipher based on f (·)
Maiorana-McFarland Functions
The Hadamard Transform of a Boolean function f :
The nonlinearity of a function f : GF (2) n → GF (2) is defined as
The Maiorana-McFarland function is defined by the equation:
where
injection or 2-to-1 map which would require k ≤ n/2 or k ≤ n/2 + 1 respectively.
The Maiorana-McFarland functions had been used extensively to construct Boolean functions with good cryptographic properties in the past decade (see [5] for a summary). Some notable examples are listed in the following two Propositions.
be defined by equation (1) . Let n be odd, k = (n − 1)/2 and φ :
Then f is a t-resilient function with nonlinearity 2
2. Let f (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ), n odd, be a t-resilient function constructed as in part 1 of this proposition.
Then h : GF (2) m → GF (2), where m = n + 1 is even and,
is t + 1-resilient and has nonlinearity 2 m−1 − 2 m/2 .
3. Let n be even, k = n/2 and φ(x 0 , . . . , x k−1 ) be a permutation in equation (1), then f (x) is a bent function, i.e. it has the highest possible nonlinearity 2 n−1 − 2 n/2−1 .
The first construction is quite useful because a nonlinearity of 2 n−1 − 2 (n−1)/2 is considered high for functions with odd number of input bits. Furthermore, when n ≡ 1 (mod 4), we can also obtain resiliency of order (n − 1)/4 [5, page 555]. The second construction derives highly nonlinear resilient function with even number of input bits from the first construction. The third construction on bent functions is widely used in cryptography because of their high nonlinearity. Some examples include the ciphers CAST and Toyocrypt [1, 15] . The functions presented in Proposition 1 has the common property that k ≈ n/2.
The saturated functions are functions which attain optimal trade-off between algebraic degree d, order of resiliency t = n − d − 1 and nonlinearity 2 n−1 − 2 t+1 . Such functions were constructed by Sarkar and Maitra in [19] . It was shown by Gong and Khoo in [9] that the saturated functions correspond to n-bit Maiorana-McFarland functions as follows.
Proposition 2. (Sarkar, Maitra [19, 9] ) Fix d ≥ 2 and let n = 2
In that case, the order of resiliency is optimal by Siegenthaler's inequality [22] and nonlinearity is optimal by Sarkar-Maitra inequality [19] .
The function in Proposition 2 has the property that k ≈ log 2 (n) n. 
If we guess n−l = n+k 2 internal state bits x 0 , . . . , x n−l−1 , then for
+ 1 clocks, the inputs to the functions g and φ will be known and the right hand sides of Equation (2) will be linearized. Thus the l equations we form with the l known output bits y 0 , . . . , y l−1 will be linear because l = n−k 2 ≤ n−k 2 + 1. Moreover, the number of unknowns is l since x n , . . . , x 2n−l−k in Equation (2) can be linearly expressed in terms of x 0 , . . . , x n−1 using the LFSR feedback relation. Therefore, we can solve for these l unknown bits by Gaussian elimination.
We can check whether our guess is correct by back-substituting and comparing with a sufficiently long keystream, e.g. of length 2n bits. Thus we have proven that:
Consider an n-bit LFSR filtered by Equation (1) where bit i of the LFSR is the ith input of f (x). The key space is reduced from 2 n to 2 (n+k)/2 bits when (n − k)/2 consecutive output bits are known.
Remark 1.
For ease of notation, we assume that (n+k)/2, (n−k)/2 are integers from now on. The case when they are not integers can be handled by adding the appropriate floor and ceiling operations as in Theorem 1.
Next we improve the attack complexity of Theorem 1 by applying the TMD attack [2] . Let f :
f (x) = n-bit output of filter function generator, when the LFSR is initialized byx ∈ GF (2) n .
Let c ∈ GF (2) (n−k)/2 be a fixed string. Given x ∈ GF (2) (n+k)/2 , we can use the proof of Theorem 1 to find s ∈ GF (2) (n−k)/2 such that:
where '||' is concatenation of bit strings. Based on this computation, we introduce a search function
for the description of our attack. We define F (c) (x) to be the right most (n + k)/2 bits off (x||s), i.e.,
The function F (c) will be the search function used in our description of the TMD attack on Maiorana-
McFarland functions. We note that this function can also simplify the description of the attack in [15] .
Let the amount of data collected be D.
Setup:
1. Randomly choose a binary string c ∈ GF (2) (n−k)/2 and define the function F (c) (x) as described above. 
Define
. Store the start and end points (SP i , EP i ) = (y i,0 , y i,t ).
Attack:
1. We look among the keystream to find D n-bit strings whose first (n−k)/2 bits matches the pattern c. For one such string, let the last (n + k)/2 bits of this string be y.
2. For each y, search among the endpoints EP i in the j th table to check if
If there is a match, then (x||s) is the secret initial state of the LFSR where
and s is the (n − k)/2-bit string computed such that the leftmost (n − k)/2 bits off (x||s) is c.
The string s can be found by solving linear equations as in the proof of Theorem 1.
3. We repeat this process for the other D − 1 strings.
The parameters in the attack satisfy the following constraint:
Based on [2] , our table only need to cover 1/D of the whole search space N = 2 (n+k)/2 = pt 2 because
we just need to break the cipher for one string out of D possible strings in the available keystream. Since we are only storing the end points, the memory M needed is pt/D. For each of the D data, we need to look up t/D tables and compute F j (x) t times for each table. The time taken is
function computations. Thus we derive the relation:
Let the memory be M = 2 mem and the number of strings of the form (c||x) (where c ∈ GF (2) (n−k)/2 is fixed) in the collected data be D = 2 d . This means we need to sample 2 (n−k)/2 +d consecutive keystream bits to collect this data. This is because the string c of length (n − k)/2 should occur on average once in 2 (n−k)/2 keystream bits. Thus the attack complexity is
We state the result formally as:
Consider an n-bit LFSR filtered by equation (1) where bit i of the LFSR is the ith input of f (x). The LFSR initial state can be found with complexity 2 2 (n+k)/2 −2(d+mem) by using 2
pre-processing and 2 mem memory when 2 (n−k)/2 +d consecutive output bits are known.
Remark 2. The method we use to generate the functions F j (x) from an LFSR is by Mukhopadyay and Sarkar [16] . The method suggested in [2, 15] (and originally by Hellman in [10] ) is to generate
by permuting the output bits of F (c) (x). But it was shown by Fiat and Naor that there exist search functions which are polynomial time indistinguishable from a random function but for which the time-memory trade-off attack fails [8] , when permutation of output bits are used. The advantage of the approach of [16] is that it is not possible to construct a Fiat-Naor type example for the LFSR-based method. Moreover, LFSR sequences are very efficient to compute. linear system) which is more complex than scanning for a fixed pattern from the keystream. The same remark applies to Example 3, 4 and 5 later in the paper.
Remark 5. Note that we need to solve a linear system of size (n − k)/2 × (n − k)/2 for each processing and pre-processing step. For most of the applications we encounter, this linear system is quite small (q × q bit system where 32 ≤ q ≤ 64). For modern 64-bit processors, this system can be efficiently solved with complexity q 2 . For larger linear systems, we need to take the complexity of Gaussian elimination into account.
Condition for the Attack to Work
Let us denote the number of guessed bits by guess = (n + k)/2. By the matrix stopping rule, we have pt 2 = 2 guess and the amount of memory used is pt/2 d = 2 mem where we use 2 d data obtained from
This implies that t = 2 guess−(mem+d) and that the number of tables is t/2 d = 2 guess−(mem+2d) .
Because we need at least one table (t/2 d ≥ 1) to launch the attack, the condition d ≤ (guess − mem)/2 must be satisfied. An identical bound holds for our subsequent attacks in Sections 5, 6 and 7 where we replace the variable "guess" by the corresponding number of guessed bits in the attack of those Sections.
Comparison with Direct Time-Memory-Data Trade-Off Attack
Note that if we attack the cipher of the previous remark directly using the TMD attack [2] without guessing any LFSR bits, we will get the same trade-offs when we take D = 2 (n−k)/2+d and 2 mem memory, i.e. the same keystream length and memory which were used. This is because we have pt 2 = 2 n and pt/2 (n−k)/2+d = 2 mem . We deduce t = 2 (n+k)/2−(mem+d) , pre-processing P = 2 n /2 (n−k)/2+d = 2 (n+k)/2−d and attack complexity T = t 2 = 2 (n+k)−2(mem+d) .
However, the number of tables is now given by t/2 (n−k)/2+d = 2 k−(mem+2d) . Thus it gives the upper bound d ≤ (k − mem)/2 for the attack to be consistent (i.e. to have at least one table). Because we always have k < n, and consequently, k < (n + k)/2 = guess, it means that we get a smaller upper bound for d if we apply the TMD attack directly, and thus a smaller bound on the total keystream length 2 (n−k)/2+d . In cases where this bound is exceeded, we will have to use a shorter keystream length in order to carry out the TMD attack of [2] , which will lead to higher pre-computation and attack complexities.
That is why it is preferable to use the TMD attack based on guessing LFSR bits. A similar reasoning holds for the other attacks in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of this paper. 
The Case when k is Approximately n/2
Consider the extreme case k ≈ n/2. There are many optimal functions belonging to this class as summarized in Proposition 1. In this case, (n−k)/2 ≈ n/4 and the key diversity is reduced to (n+k)/2 ≈ In the attack phase, we search amongst the keystream of length 2 n−k 2 +d = 2 32+16 = 2 48 to find 2 16 substrings matching the pattern c. For each such string, we let the last (n + k)/2 = 96 bits of this string be y. Then for each y, we check if multiple applications of the search function F 1 (y), i.e. F 1 (y), y) ), etc. match any end-points in the table. If so, then we have found the secret internal state of the corresponding data, which can be computed as in the description of the attack in Section 3.
To summarise, the complexity of the time-memory-data trade-off attack for pre-processing and attack We can seemingly achieve the same pre-processing and attack complexities of 2 80 and 2 32 respectively with 2 48 consecutive output bits and 2 64 memory when we apply the TMD attack without any guessing, as was illustrated in Section 3.2. This is not possible in practice since the number of tables t/D calculated using these values is 2 64−(64+2×16) = 2 −32 , and there has to be at least one 
The Case when k is Much Smaller than n
The other extreme is when k n. This scenario may occur when we use a saturated function from Proposition 2. In this case, k is much smaller than n and the key diversity (n + k)/2 can be taken to be approximately n/2. The minimum number of consecutive output bits l = (n − k)/2 needed is also approximately n/2. Suppose we collect 2 d = 1 (where d = 0) ciphertext corresponding to a pre-computed n/2-bit pattern, i.e. we need 2 n/2 consecutive keystream bits. Then in a time-memory-data trade-off attack using 2 mem memory, the complexity is 2 n/2 for pre-processing and 2 n−2mem−1 for the attack.
Unlike the case k ≈ n/2, we can use less memory here because the search space is smaller. Even though n is slightly larger than that in Example 1, the memory, pre-computation and attack complexity are smaller.
From the above discussion, we see that as k decreases, the memory, pre-computation and attack complexity decreases but the number of consecutive keystream bits needed increases. Sometimes it is not possible to obtain so many keystream bits for time-memory-data trade-off attack on equation 2.
It may be more feasible to use Theorem 1 directly and perform an exhaustive search with complexity 2 (n+k)/2 based on (n − k)/2 consecutive output bits.
When the LFSR and Boolean Functions have Different Sizes
As a generalization, we consider the above attack when an n-bit LFSR is filtered by a m-bit Maiorana-
McFarland function f (x) where m < n. Let the function be of the form
Therefore the function f (x) becomes linear when the first r input bits are fixed. Let these r input bits be tapped from amongst the leftmost k bits of the LFSR, and the remaining m − r input bits of f (x) be tapped from amongst the rightmost n − k LFSR bits.
As before, assume l = n−k 2 consecutive output bits of f (x) are known and we guess n − l = n+k 2 leftmost LFSR bits. Then we can form l linear equations with l unknown variables of the LFSR initial state. So knowing (n − k)/2 consecutive output bits will reduce the initial state space from n bits to n − l = (n + k)/2 bits. It is easy to see that we can apply the TMD attack as in Section 3 by using the same search function F (c) (x). The attack complexity for direct exhaustive search and TMD attack is the same as before but now, the parameter k depends not just on f (x) but also on the tap points from the LFSR. We summarize our discussion as a theorem:
Theorem 3. Consider an n-bit LFSR which is filtered by a m-bit Maiorana-McFarland function defined by equation (3) . Suppose the first r bits of f (x) is tapped from amongst the leftmost k bits of the LFSR, and the remaining m − r input bits of f (x) is tapped from amongst the rightmost n − k LFSR bits. Then the keyspace is reduced from 2 n to 2 (n+k)/2 when (n − k)/2 consecutive output bits are known.
Furthermore, the LFSR initial state can be found with 2
We illustrate the attack with the following example.
Example 3. Consider a 13-bit LFSR filtered by a 4-bit Boolean function f (x).
f (x) becomes linear when we fix the first two bits x 0 , x 1 , i.e. n = 13, m = 4 and r = 2. At time i, let the output be y i and the LFSR state be (x i , x i+1 , . . . , x i+12 ). Number the positions of the LFSR by 0, . . . , 12
and let the tap points to (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) be LF SR[0, 3, 5, 9] . f (x) is linear when the first two tap points 0 and 3 are known, so k = 4. Suppose we know (n − k)/2 = 5 consecutive output bits y 1 , . . . , y 5 and we guess (n + k)/2 = 8 consecutive LFSR bits x 0 , . . . , x 7 . Form the equations:
The equations for i = 0, 1, 2 allows us to find x 9 , x 10 , x 11 . The equation for i = 3 involves the unknown bits x 8 and x 12 . The equation for i = 4 involves the unknown bit x 13 which can be written as a linear function of the unknown bits x 8 , x 12 through the LFSR relation. Thus these two linear equations can be solved for x 8 , x 12 . Therefore we can reduce the complexity of the initial state space from 13-bit to 8-bit when 5 consecutive output bits are known.
After the search space reduction, we may apply the TMD attack but for this small example, it is easier to search directly.
Extending the Attack to Filter Combiner Model
In this section, we extend the search space reduction and TMD attack on the filter combiner model. For ease of explanation, we consider the case of two linear feedback shift registers LF SR 1 and LF SR 2 . The attacks on more LFSR's are similar. At each clock cycle, a Boolean function will take as input several state bits from each of LF SR 1 and LF SR 2 to output a keystream bit.
Let the length of LF SR 1 be n 1 and that of LF SR 2 be n 2 . Let f : GF (2) m → GF (2) be defined by:
Therefore when we fix the first r input bits, f (x) becomes linear.
Let the first r input bits of f (x), i.e. (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x r−1 ) be tapped from amongst the leftmost k 1 and k 2 bits of LF SR 1 and LF SR 2 . Let the rest of the n − r input bits be tapped from amongst the rightmost n 1 − k 1 and n 2 − k 2 bits of LF SR 1 and LF SR 2 .
Suppose we know l consecutive output bits y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y l−1 . Let us guess the leftmost k 1 + l and k 2 + l bits of LF SR 1 and LF SR 2 . Then at time i, φ(x i , . . . , x i+r−1 ), g(x i , . . . , x i+r−1 ) are known for all i = 0, 1, . . . , l − 1. This means:
is a linear equation for i = 0, 1, . . . , l − 1.
We have l equations in n 1 − (k 1 + l) + n 2 − (k 2 + l) variables. For this linear system to be solvable, we need
We take l = ((n 1 − k 1 ) + (n 2 − k 2 ))/3 . Thus the search space is reduced from 2 n1+n2 to:
The TMD attack can be applied for our scenario as follows.
to be:
are initialized by (x 1 ,x 2 ).
For a fixed string c ∈ GF (2) l and x i ∈ GF (2) ki+l , we can find s i ∈ GF (2) ni−(ki+l) such that f (x 1 ||s 1 , x 2 ||s 2 ) = (c||y) by the method described above. Based on this computation, we define a In a similar way, the search space reduction and TMD attack of a filter combiner with s LFSR can be computed. We state this formally as:
Theorem 4. Consider a filter combiner where equation (4) filters the content of LF SR 1 , LF SR 2 , . . . , LF SR s of size n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n s respectively. Let the first r bits of equation (4) be tapped from amongst the leftmost k i bits of LF SR i . And let the remaining m − r bits be tapped from amongst the rightmost n i − k i bits of LF SR i , i = 1, 2, . . . , s. 
Extending the Attack to Vectorial Maiorana-McFarland Functions
In this section, we consider the case where an n-bit LFSR is filtered by a vectorial Maiorana-McFarland functions F : GF (2) n → GF (2) m defined by:
where each function f j : GF (2) n → GF (2) is defined by:
for j = 0, 1, . . . , m − 1. This case may occur in practice because the encryption speed of a vector output generator is m times faster than a single bit filter function generator.
For good security, we want any linear combination of f j (x) to correspond to a t-resilient Maiorana-
McFarland function with high nonlinearity. The usual method to construct F (x) is to ensure that linear combinations of f j (x) correspond to concatenation of linear functions which are distinct and each linear function in the concatenation is an expression in t + 1 or more variables. This can be achieved by using linear codes as shown in [17] .
We assume bit i of the LFSR is the i-th input of F (x). Suppose we know l consecutive output words,
i.e. l × m consecutive output bits. 
. . .
We have l × m equations in n − (k + l) unknowns. For this linear system to be solvable, we need:
We take l = (n − k)/(m + 1) . Thus the search space is reduced from 2 n to 2 k+l = 2 k+ (n−k)/(m+1) .
The TMD attack can be applied for our scenario as follows. Let l = (n − k)/(m + 1) , we define a search functionF : GF (2) n → GF (2) k+(m+1)l to be F (x) = the (k + (m + 1)l)-bit output keystream when the LFSR is initialized byx ∈ GF (2) n .
For a fixed string c ∈ GF (2) ml and x ∈ GF (2) k+l , we can find s ∈ GF (2) n−(k+l) such thatF (x||s) = (c||y) by the method described above. Based on this computation, we define a search function F (c) :
k+l to be the rightmost k + l bits ofF (x||s), i.e., 
. Consider an n-bit LFSR filtered by equation (5) where bit i of the LFSR is the i-th input of F (x). The key space is reduced from 2 n to 2 k+l when ml consecutive output bits are known.
Furthermore, the LFSR initial states can be found with 2 2(k+l−(d+mem)) processing, 2 k+l−d preprocessing and 2 mem memory when m × 2 ml+d consecutive keystream bits are known. Then by Theorem 5, l = 64/(m + 1) and the reduced search space is 2 64+l . Suppose we apply TMD attack with 2 d ciphertext whose first m × l bits correspond to a fixed string c. Then we need a keystream 1. In Theorem 2 and 5, we have adopted the convention that the first k input bits of f (x) are always tapped from the leftmost k bits of the LFSR. It is easy to see that the attacks have the same complexities if we tap any k consecutive bits of the LFSR.
2. Similarly, in Theorem 3, we can tap the first r input bits of f (x) from any consecutive k bits of the LFSR. In Theorem 4, we can tap the r bits from any consecutive k 1 , . . . , k s bits of LF SR 1 , . . . , LF SR s respectively.
3. In our attacks, we have presented the TMD attack on Maiorana-McFarland functions because it is a well-known and common construction in the Boolean function literature. In that case, the function becomes linear when the leftmost k bits are known. To make the attack more general, we can look at any n-bit Boolean function which becomes linear when k (not necessarily consecutive)
input bits are known.
Consequences on Design of Stream Ciphers
Consider the filter combiner in Theorem 4 that filters the contents of the s LFSRs. To prevent our attack, we can choose the k i 's such that the reduced attack complexity 2 k1+...+ks+s×l is not significantly better than exhaustive search complexity. For example, if n 1 = n 2 = n 3 = n 4 = 32 and we choose the tap points from the LFSR's to f (x) such that k 1 = 23, k 2 = 24, k 3 = 25 and k 4 = 26, then l = 6. In this case the attack complexity is 2 23+24+25+26+4×6 = 2 122 , which is not a significant improvement over the exhaustive search complexity of 2 128 . Heuristically, to prevent our attack, one needs to 1. Choose the k i 's to be large enough so that the attacker has to guess almost the entire content of the LFSRs, i.e. the tap points should be spaced out wide enough.
2. Ensure the filter function f (x) taps from as many of the s LFSRs as possible.
Please note that the above considerations only protect against the attacks in this paper. They have to be combined with other design criteria to protect against other cryptanalysis on stream ciphers.
Conclusion
We have generalized the Mihaljevic-Imai time-memory-data trade-off attack on Toyocrypt [15] to apply on any filter function generator using a Maiorana-McFarland function. We further explore different configurations when the filter function is smaller than the LFSR, when several LFSR's are used and when vector output functions are used. Further generalizations based on replacing LFSR's with other linear finite state machines, using different tap points and using more general Boolean functions are proposed. We showed that the attack can be effectively applied in all these scenarios to significantly reduce the attack complexities. Because the Maiorana-McFarland function is a popular Boolean function construction, our attack may be a useful tool for stream cipher cryptanalysis.
There are many other stream cipher attacks which may be more effective than the TMD attack. For example, if the Boolean function has weak correlation properties, we may be able to apply correlation attack [4, 22] . When a certain multiple of the Boolean function has low degree, we can apply the algebraic attack [6] . When the stream cipher has a linear re-synchronization mechanism, we may apply the resynch-attack [7] . However, if the stream cipher is designed to protect against these attacks, and a Maiorana-McFarland function (a popular choice) is used, the TMD attack is a viable alternative.
